The First Conventional Attempts: The Genesis of Modern Arms Control
In this video you will learn about:
- the interplay between arms transfer control and the limitation of armaments; and the emergence of disarmament and arms control thinking in modern times (as part of the laws of war and international humanitarian law)
- the main multilateral initiatives taken during the second part of the nineteenth century: The Hague conferences leading to the Conventions of 1899 and 1907 concerning disarmament; the laws of war and war crimes; as well as other less well known, yet general arms control initiatives, such as the Brussels Conference Act (1890), the first multilateral agreement for regulating the African firearms trade
From Solferino to the Interwar Period
The Impression of Modern Warfare
The 19th century wars, like the American Civil War (1861–1865) or the Battle of Solferino (1859) paved the way for a legal framework for the conduct of hostilities by the belligerents. The first Geneva Convention dates from 1864.
The Great War
Proceeding in the same spirit and with a similar reaction, the First World War seemed to indicate to the major witnesses and protagonists that the accumulation of armaments, their destructive power and technological innovations in the field of infantry and artillery had been decisive factors in the outbreak and longevity of hostilities.
Hopes and Fears in the Interwar Period
The accumulation of armaments became one of the privileged targets of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy during the 1920s and 1930s, within the framework of the new League of Nations, as introduced by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The undertaking of disarmament was the great challenge and the great hope of the interwar period.
The Rise of Germany and Japan: The Failure of Disarmament?
Germany’s rise to power and rearmament in the 1930s, as well as Japan’s strategic emergence and expansion, ultimately put an end to multilateral disarmament efforts, but also indicated that the targeting of arms volumes was highly insufficient to break the dynamics of inter-state accumulation and competition. On the eve of the Second World War, the multilateral disarmament enterprise not only failed, but also had failed: indicating that disarmament, as such, was not a guarantee of security for states.
Thus, the failure of disarmament between the two world wars, even before the invention of nuclear weapons, was a methodological failure with regard to the objective of regulating the volume of violence between states. However, the philosophy of disarmament persisted after the Second World War and continued to inspire many diplomatic, political and civil initiatives.
The Disarmament Process Between the Two World Wars
- 1918
Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points
- 1919
- Treaty of Versailles
- Covenant of the League of Nations (Read the whole Charter of the League).
- 1921–1922
Washington Naval Conference
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- 1925
- Locarno Accords
- Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol, entry into force 1928)
- 1928
Kellogg-Briand Pact (63 signatures, entry into force 1929)
- 1931
Japanese invasion of Manchuria
- 1932–1934
Geneva Disarmament Conference
- 1932
Japan quits League of Nations.
- 1933
Germany quits League of Nations.
- 1935
Italian invasion of Abyssinia
- 1937
Italy quits League of Nations.
- 1939
Soviet invasion of Finland, German invasion of Poland
Nuclear Weapons: Strategic Rupture and the Shift in Arms Control Thinking
The invention of nuclear weapons gave arms control the main form of its exercise even today, partly modifying the value and purpose of the discipline as traditionally conceived. In this video you will learn:
- how nuclear arms control was based on a tripod: bipolar world order, structuring conflict between the two poles, bilateral acceptance of the notion of strategic parity
- how the discipline has been reshaped to build a predictable nuclear relationship through transparency mechanisms
- how arms control led the United States and the USSR to co-manage deterrence and how it slowly became a bilateral technique and a paradoxical form of partnership
The Idea Behind Strategic Stability
Strategic stability is both a concept and a phenomenon adopted and defined during the Cold War. At that time, it had complementary meanings. First, it meant the predictability of the strategic relationship between the two major actors in peacetime (arms race stability). To achieve this, stability meant not having an incentive to increase one’s nuclear arsenal in order to prevent one of the adversaries from gaining a decisive advantage by using nuclear weapons first.
It was also about the predictability of the strategic relationship in times of crisis (crisis stability) as well as the absence of risk of an adverse first strike (first strike stability). This was a central theme of the strategic debate in the 1960s. Behaviour, perceptions and signals should not encourage the adversary to carry out a nuclear first strike to protect himself from an adverse first strike.
In the traditional sense, therefore, adversaries should not be tempted to carry out an anti-force first strike or a surprise attack without taking major risks, and each should have a protected second-strike capability, refraining from setting up strategic territory defences against a massive attack. In the same spirit, both sides must agree on political and legal instruments that codify and control competition between them.
In particular, it is necessary to prohibit the deployment, production and/or development of certain systems.
It can be seen that arms control during the Cold War is intimately linked to the notion of strategic stability. It was its operational extension.
Strategic stability may have been confused with mutually assured destruction, which is a narrow version of it. However, strategic stability is mainly measured by the ability of actors to respond to a first strike, and thus to have a credible second strike capability. In this respect, the ABM Treaty could be called a pillar of strategic stability because it largely limited the possibilities of deploying missile defence systems.
Over time, theorists and practitioners have sought to develop a broader and less schematic definition of strategic stability. Thus, the notion has gradually been conceived as a set of norms, rules and procedures designed to prevent one state from rapidly gaining a strategic advantage over another. In particular, stability can be enhanced by a range of measures that go beyond military and arms control.
Quiz
Now it’s your turn! Take the quiz to check what you have learned so far.
If you want, you can also skip the quiz and move right on to the next chapter.